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Abstract
Machine learning systems and also, specifically, automatic
speech recognition (ASR) systems are vulnerable against ad-
versarial attacks, where an attacker maliciously changes the in-
put. In the case of ASR systems, the most interesting cases are
targeted attacks, in which an attacker aims to force the system
into recognizing given target transcriptions in an arbitrary audio
sample. The increasing number of sophisticated, quasi imper-
ceptible attacks raises the question of countermeasures.
In this paper, we focus on hybrid ASR systems and compare
four acoustic models regarding their ability to indicate uncer-
tainty under attack: a feed-forward neural network and three
neural networks specifically designed for uncertainty quan-
tification, namely a Bayesian neural network, Monte Carlo
dropout, and a deep ensemble.
We employ uncertainty measures of the acoustic model to
construct a simple one-class classification model for assessing
whether inputs are benign or adversarial. Based on this ap-
proach, we are able to detect adversarial examples with an area
under the receiving operator curve score of more than 0.99. The
neural networks for uncertainty quantification simultaneously
diminish the vulnerability to the attack, which is reflected in a
lower recognition accuracy of the malicious target text in com-
parison to a standard hybrid ASR system.
Index Terms: Uncertainty quantification, adversarial attacks
1. Introduction
An increasing number of smart devices are entering our homes
to support us in our everyday life. Many of such devices are
equipped with automatic speech recognition (ASR) to make
their handling even more convenient. While we rely on ASR
systems to understand the spoken commands, it has been shown
that adversarial attacks can fool ASR systems [1, 2, 3, 4]. These
attacks add (to some extent) imperceptible noise to the original
audio, which fools the ASR system to output a false—attacker-
chosen—transcription.
This manipulated transcription can be especially danger-
ous in security- and safety-critical environments such as smart
homes or self-driving cars. In such environments, audio adver-
sarial examples may, for example, be used to deactivate alarm
systems or to place unwanted online orders.
There have been numerous attempts to tackle the prob-
lem of adversarial examples in neural networks (NNs). How-
ever, it has been shown that the existence of these examples
is a consequence of the high dimensionality of NN architec-
tures [5, 6]. To defend against adversarial attacks, several ap-
proaches aim e. g., at making their calculation harder by adding
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stochasticity and reporting prediction uncertainties [7, 8, 9].
Ideally, the model should display high uncertainties if and only
if abnormal observations like adversarial examples or out-of-
distribution data are fed to the system. Akinwande et al. [10]
and Samizade et al. [11] used anomaly detection, either in
the network’s activations or directly on raw audio, to detect
adversarial examples. However, both methods are trained
for defined attacks and are therefore easy to circumvent [12].
Zeng et al. [13] have combined the output of multiple ASR sys-
tems and calculated a similarity score between the transcrip-
tions. Nevertheless, due to the transferability-property of ad-
versarial examples to other models, this countermeasure is not
guaranteed to be successful [14]. Yang et al. [15] also utilize
temporal dependencies of the input signal. For this, they com-
pare the transcription of the entire utterance with a segment-
wise transcription of the utterance. In case of a benign exam-
ple, both transcriptions should be the same, which will typically
not be the case for an adversarial example. Other works lever-
aged uncertainty measures to improve the robustness of ASR
systems in the absence of adversarial examples. Vyas et al. [16]
used dropout and the respective transcriptions to measure the
reliability of the ASR system’s prediction. Abdelaziz et al. [17]
and Huemmer et al. [18] have previously utilized the propaga-
tion of observation uncertainties through the layers of a neural
network acoustic model via Monte Carlo sampling to increase
the reliability of these systems under acoustic noise.
We combine the insights about uncertainty quantification
from the deep learning community with ASR systems to im-
prove the robustness against adversarial attacks. For this pur-
pose, we make the following contributions:
1. We substitute the ASR system’s standard feed-forward
NN (fNN) with different network architectures, which
are capable of capturing model uncertainty, namely
Bayesian NNs (BNN) [19], Monte Carlo (MC)
dropout [20] and deep ensembles [21].
2. We calculate different measures to assess the uncertainty
when predicting an utterance. Specifically, we measure
the entropy, variance, averaged Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence, and the mutual information of the NN outputs.
3. We train a one-class classifier by fitting a normal dis-
tribution on the values w.r.t. these measure for an ex-
emplary set of benign examples. Adversarial examples
can then be detected as outliers of the learned distribu-
tion. Compared to previous work, this has the advantage
that we do not need any adversarial examples to train the
classifier and are not tailored to specific kinds of attacks.
The results show that we are able to detect adversarial ex-
amples with an area under the receiver operating characteris-
tic curve score of more than 0.99 using the NNs output en-
tropy. Additionally, the NNs used for uncertainty quantification
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are less vulnerable to adversarial attacks when compared to a
standard feed-forward neural network. The code is available at
github.com/rub-ksv/uncertaintyASR.
2. Background
In the following, we briefly outline the estimation of adversar-
ial examples for hybrid ASR systems and introduce a set of ap-
proaches for uncertainty quantification in neural networks.
2.1. Adversarial Examples
For simplicity, we assume that the ASR system can be written as
a function f , which takes an audio signal x as input and maps it
to its most likely transcription f(x), which should be consistent
or at least close to the real transcription y. Adversarial examples
are a modification of x, where specific minimal noise δ is added
to corrupt the prediction, i. e., to yield f(x+ δ) 6= f(x).
In this general setting, the calculation of adversarial exam-
ples for ASR systems can be divided into two steps:
Step 1: Forced Alignment. Forced alignment is typically
used for training hybrid ASR systems if no exact alignments be-
tween the audio input and the transcription segments are avail-
able. The resulting alignment can be used to obtain the NN
output targets for Step 2. Here, we utilize the forced alignment
algorithm to find the best possible alignment between the origi-
nal audio input and the malicious target transcription.
Step 2: Projected Gradient Descent. In this paper, we use
the projected gradient descent (PGD) method to create adversar-
ial examples for the targets derived in Step 1. PGD finds solu-
tions by gradient descent, i.e., by iteratively computing the gra-
dient of a loss with respect to δ and moving into this direction.
To remain in the allowed perturbation space, δ is constrained to
remain below a pre-defined maximum perturbation .
2.2. Neural Networks for Uncertainty Quantification
A range of approaches have recently been proposed for quanti-
fying uncertainty in NNs:
Bayesian Neural Networks: A mathematically grounded
method for quantifying uncertainty in neural networks is given
by Bayesian NNs (BNNs) [19]. Central to these methods is
the calculation of a posterior distribution over the network pa-
rameters, which models the probabilities of different prediction
networks. The final predictive function is derived as
p(y|x,D) =
∫
p(y|x, θ)p(θ|D)dθ , (1)
where p(θ|D) is the posterior distribution of the parameters θ,
y the output, x the input and D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 the training
set. To approximate the often intractable posterior distribution,
variational inference methods can be applied. These fit a sim-
pler distribution q(θ|D) as close to the true posterior as possible
by minimizing their Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD). Min-
imizing this, again intractable, KLD is equal to maximizing the
so-called evidence lower bound (ELBO) given by
Eq(θ|D)[log p(yi|xi, θ)]− KLD[q(θ|D)||p(θ)] . (2)
During prediction, the integral of Eq. (1) is approximated by av-
eraging p(y|x, θt) for multiple samples θt drawn from q(θ|D).
While there are different approaches to BNNs, we follow
Louizos et al. [22] in this paper.
Monte Carlo Dropout: Another approach that scales to
deep NN architectures is Monte Carlo dropout [20], which was
introduced as an approximation to the Bayesian inference. In
this approach, the neurons of an NN are dropped with a fixed
probability during training and testing. This can be seen as
sampling different sub-networks consisting of only a subset of
the neurons and leading to different prediction results for the
same input. Here θt denotes the model parameters for the t-
th sub-network and the final prediction is given by p(y|x) =
1
T
∑T
t=1 p(y|x, θt).
Deep Ensembles: A simple approach, which has been
found to often outperform more complex ones [23], is the use
of a deep ensemble [21]. The core idea is to train multiple NNs
with different parameter initializations on the same data set. In
this context, we denote the prediction result of the t-th NN by
p(y|x, θt). The final prediction is again given by the average
over all T model p(y|x) = 1
T
∑T
t=1 p(y|x, θt).
3. Approach
For the detection of the attack, i. e., the identification of adver-
sarial examples, we describe the general attack setting and the
different uncertainty measures that we employ.
3.1. Threat Model
We assume a white-box setting in which the attacker has full ac-
cess to the model, including all parameters. Using this knowl-
edge, the attacker generates adversarial examples offline. We
only consider targeted attacks, where the adversary chooses the
target transcription. Additionally, we assume that the trained
ASR system remains unchanged over time.
3.2. Uncertainty Measures
For quantifying prediction uncertainty, we employ the follow-
ing measures:
Entropy: To measure the uncertainty of the network over
class predictions, we calculate the entropy over the K output
classes as
H[p(y|x)] = −
K∑
c=1
p(yc|x) · log p(yc|x) . (3)
This can be done for all network types, including the fNN with
a softmax output layer. We calculate the entropy for each time
step and use its maximum value as the uncertainty measure.
Mutual Information: To leverage the possible benefits
of replacing the fNN with a BNN, MC dropout, or a deep
ensemble, we evaluate the multiple predictions p(y|x, θt) for
t = 1, ..., T of these networks. Note that these probabilities are
derived differently for each network architecture, as described
in Section 2. With this setup we can calculate the mutual in-
formation (MI), which is upper bounded by the entropy and de-
fined through
MI = H[p(y|x)]− 1
T
T∑
t=1
H[p(y|x, θt)] . (4)
The MI indicates the inherent uncertainty of the model on the
presented data [24].
Variance: Another measure that has been used by Fein-
man et al. [9] to detect adversarial examples for image recogni-
tion tasks is the variance of the different predictions:
1
T
T∑
t=1
p(y|x, θt)2 − p(y|x)2 . (5)
Averaged Kullback-Leibler Divergence: To observe the
variations of the distributions—without the mean reduction
used for the variance—we further introduce the averaged
Kullback-Leibler divergence (aKLD). It is defined as
1
T − 1
T−1∑
t=1
p(y|x, θt) · log p(y|x, θt)
p(y|x, θt+1) . (6)
Because the samples θt are drawn independently, we compare
the first drawn example to the second, the second to the third,
and so on without any reordering.
4. Experiments
In the following, we give implementation details and describe
the results of our experimental analysis.
4.1. Recognizer
We use a hybrid deep neural network - hidden Markov model
ASR system. As a proof of concept for adversarial example
detection, we focus on a simple recognizer for sequences of
digits from 0 to 9. The code is available at github.com/
rub-ksv/uncertaintyASR.
We train the recognizer with the TIDIGITS training set,
which includes approximately 8000 utterances of digit se-
quences. The feature extraction is integrated into the NNs via
torchaudio. We use the first 13 mel-frequency cepstral coeffi-
cients (MFCCs) and their first and second derivatives as input
features and train the NNs for 3 epochs followed by 3 additional
epochs of Viterbi training to improve the ASR performance.
We use NNs with two hidden layers, each with 100 neu-
rons, and a softmax output layer of size 95, corresponding to
the number of states of the hidden Markov model (HMM). For
the deep ensemble, we train T = 5 networks with different
initialization; for the BNN, we draw T = 5 models from the
posterior distribution and average the outputs to form the final
prediction; and for dropout, we sample T = 100 sub-networks
for the average prediction.1
The ASR accuracies are evaluated on a test set of 1000
benign utterances and are shown in Table 1, calculated as the
sum over all substituted words S, inserted words I , and deleted
words D in comparison to the original and the target label
Accuracy =
N −D + I + S
N
, (7)
where N is the total number of words of the reference text, ei-
ther the original or the malicious target text.
All methods lead to a reasonable accuracy, with the deep
ensemble models outperforming the fNN. At the same time,
there is some loss of performance for the MC dropout model
and the BNN model.
4.2. Adversarial Attack
For the attack, we use a sequence of randomly chosen digits
with a random length between 1 and 5. The corresponding
targets for the attack have been calculated with the Montreal
forced aligner [25]. To pass the targets through the NN we used
1Note, that we needed to increase the number of samples for dropout
compared to the other methods, since using T = 5 for dropout led to
worse recognition accuracy. Moreover, we also needed to estimate the
average gradient over 10 sub-nets per training sample during training to
observe increased robustness against adversarial examples.
Table 1: Accuracy on benign examples.
fNN deep ensemble MC dropout BNN
0.991 0.994 0.973 0.981
the projected gradient descent (PGD) attack [26]. For this pur-
pose, we used cleverhans, a Python library to assess machine
learning systems against adversarial examples [27].
During preliminary experiments, we found that using mul-
tiple samples for estimating the stochastic gradient for the es-
timation of adversarial examples decreases the strength of the
attack. This result contradicts insights found for BNNs in im-
age classification tasks, where the adversarial attacks become
stronger when multiple samples are drawn for the gradient [28].
An explanation for this finding could be that for image classifi-
cation, no hybrid system is used. In contrast to that, the Viterbi
decoder in a hybrid ASR exerts an additional influence on the
recognizer output and favors cross-temporal consistency.
Figure 1: Accuracy with respect to the original and the target
transcription plotted over  for fNN, MC dropout, BNN, and
deep ensemble, evaluated on 100 utterances each.
Correspondingly, our empirical results indicate that sam-
pling multiple times leads to unfavorable results for ASR from
the attacker’s perspective. Evaluating the averaged and the sin-
gle adversarial examples separately shows that the averaged ad-
versarial examples are more likely to return the original text
due to the Viterbi decoding of the hybrid ASR system. Con-
sequently, we have only used one sample to improve the at-
tacker’s performance and, thus, evaluate our defense mecha-
nisms against a harder opponent.
To validate the effectiveness of PGD, we investigate the
word accuracy of the label predicted for the resulting adversar-
ial example w.r.t. the target and the original transcription. These
word accuracies are shown in Figure 1 for varying perturbation
strength ( = 0, . . . , 0.1 with a step size of 0.01) of PGD attack.
Note that  = 0 corresponds to benign examples, as no pertur-
bations are added to the original audio signal. We evaluated 100
adversarial examples for each  and NN.
For all models, the accuracy w.r.t. the target transcription
increases with increasing perturbation strength until approxi-
mately  = 0.04, and stagnates afterward. The attack has the
Figure 2: Histograms of predictive entropy values for an fNN
for 1000 benign and 1000 adversarial examples.
most substantial impact on the fNN-based model, where the ac-
curacy w.r.t. the malicious target transcription for  ≥ 0.05 is
almost 50 % higher than for the other models, where the accu-
racy only reaches values between 0.4 and 0.7. This indicates
that including NNs for uncertainty quantification into ASR sys-
tems makes it more challenging to calculate effective targeted
adversarial attacks. Nevertheless, the accuracy w.r.t the original
transcription is equally affected across all systems, indicating
that for all of them, the original text is difficult to recover un-
der attack.
4.3. Classifying Adversarial Examples
In order to detect adversarial examples, we calculate the mea-
sures described in Section 3.2 for 1000 benign and 1000 adver-
sarial examples, estimated via PGD with  = 0.05. Figure 2
exemplary shows histograms of the entropy values of the pre-
dictive distribution of the fNN over both sets of examples. Like
the fNN, all other models also clearly tend to display higher un-
certainty over classes for adversarial examples, while the differ-
ence between benign and adversarial examples was most severe
for the entropy.
We build on this observation by constructing simple classi-
fiers for the detection of adversarial examples: We fit a Gaussian
distribution to the values of the corresponding measure over a
held-out data set of 1000 benign examples for each network and
measure. A new observation can then be classified as an attack
if the value of the prediction uncertainty has low probability
under the Gaussian model. We measure the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) of these classifiers for each model type and
uncertainty measure. The results are shown exemplarily for the
BNN in Figure 3. Additionally, we display the area under the
ROC curve (AUROC) in Table 2. The results show that only
the entropy has stable performance across all kinds of NNs and
clearly outperforms the other measures (variance, aKLD, and
MI). Note that the entropy is also the only measure that can be
calculated for the fNN.
To verify the results for adversarial examples with low per-
turbations, which might be harder to detect, we followed the
same approach for 1000 adversarial examples with a maximal
perturbation of  = 0.02. The results, shown in Table 3, are
similar to the ones with the higher perturbation.
5. Discussion & Conclusions
Our empirical results show that in a hybrid speech recognition
system, replacing the standard feed-forward neural network by
a Bayesian neural network, Monte Carlo dropout, or deep en-
Figure 3: ROC curves of the different measures for the BNN
with  = 0.05 on 1000 benign and adversarial examples each.
Table 2: AUROC feature scores for 1000 adversarial examples
with a perturbation strength  = 0.05. Best results for each
network are shown in bold.
Variance aKLD MI Entropy
fNN – – – 0.989
deep ensemble 0.455 0.892 0.993 0.990
MC dropout 0.637 0.443 0.498 0.978
BNN 0.667 0.777 0.794 0.988
Table 3: AUROC feature scores for 1000 adversarial examples
with a perturbation strength  = 0.02. Best results for each
network are shown in bold.
Variance aKLD MI Entropy
fNN – – – 0.997
deep ensemble 0.461 0.624 0.964 0.996
MC dropout 0.937 0.578 0.411 0.991
BNN 0.489 0.448 0.462 0.998
semble networks increases the robustness against targeted ad-
versarial examples tremendously. This can be seen in the low
accuracy of the target transcription, which indicates a far lower
vulnerability than that of standard hybrid speech recognition.
Another finding of this work is that the entropy serves as
a good measure for identifying adversarial examples. In our
experiments, we were able to discriminate between benign and
adversarial examples with an AUROC score of up to 0.99 for all
network architectures. Interestingly, the other measures which
are available when using approaches especially designed for un-
certainty quantification did not improve upon these results.
In future research, it would be interesting to evaluate this
setting on a large-vocabulary speech recognition system, to see
if (an expected) qualitative difference appears between the net-
works.
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